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FOREWORD
OFFICIAL WRONGDOING AND THE CIVIL
LIABILITY OF THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT AND OFFICERS
GREGORY C. SISK*
During the past several decades, Congress has progressively relaxed
the protection of sovereign immunity for the federal government and has
granted consent for individuals to seek relief in a judicial forum for most
categories of claims against the federal government.1 As I have described it
previously, congressional enactments “have woven a broad tapestry of au-
thorized judicial actions against the federal government.”2 The statutory re-
gime expresses a general legislative intent that the federal government
should be held responsible for its obligations and accountable for its mis-
deeds. Furthermore, Congress generally has directed that judicial review
should be available to ensure that government obligations are legally satis-
fied and that compensation is provided to those who are harmed by govern-
mental misconduct.
At the same time, as the Supreme Court said more than half a century
ago, “[i]t is too late in the day to urge that the Government is just another
private litigant, for purposes of charging it with liability.”3 Nearly everyone
agrees that, because the federal government represents the whole commu-
nity and thus often must act in ways that a private party cannot or should
not, the government’s exposure to liability must be controlled. A solitary
objector cannot be permitted in every instance to obtain a judicial ruling
that contravenes or penalizes the decisions of the community duly made
* Pio Cardinal Laghi Chair in Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law (Minnesota)
(gcsisk@stthomas.edu). Portions of this foreword are adapted from GREGORY C. SISK, LITIGATION
WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (ALI-ABA, 4th ed. 2006) [hereinafter SISK, LITIGATION] , and
GREGORY C. SISK, LITIGATION WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS (Foun-
dation Press, 2d ed. 2008).
1. On the history of statutory waivers of sovereign immunity over the last 150 years, see
generally Gregory C. Sisk, The Continuing Drift of Federal Sovereign Immunity Jurisprudence,
50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 517, 529–43 (2008).
2. Gregory C. Sisk, The Tapestry Unravels: Statutory Waivers of Sovereign Immunity and
Money Claims Against the United States, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 602, 603 (2003).
3. Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 383 (1947).
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through the ordinary processes of government. The hard question is how
and where to draw the line between those kinds of harm caused by govern-
ment that are properly the subject for a judicial remedy by a damages judg-
ment against the United States or its officers and those collateral, but
sometimes substantial, consequences of vital or policy-oriented government
operations that should be shielded from judicial review.
On the one hand, no less eminent a figure than President Abraham
Lincoln argued that “[i]t is as much the duty of Government to render
prompt justice against itself, in favor of its citizens, as it is to administer the
same between private individuals.”4 On the other hand, administrative law
scholar Richard Pierce reminds us that “[t]he process of governing almost
always helps some and hurts others, but those who are hurt should not nec-
essarily be entitled to damages from the government.”5
If a private-sector employer deliberately sends an employee into
harm’s way knowing that he is likely to be killed or injured, the employee
or his survivors may be able to recover against the employer under an inten-
tional tort theory, notwithstanding the otherwise available immunity to em-
ployers under workers’ compensation law.6 But a soldier employed in the
armed services who is ordered to lead the charge into battle, despite the
grave prospect of death or injury, may not invoke the law of torts to obtain
recovery by alleging dereliction in the chain of military command.7
If a private manufacturer provides or transports a dangerous product,
while bypassing measures that could have made the product safer to avoid
additional expense or delay in production, the manufacturer may be liable
for injuries. The courts will not hesitate to question the economic efficiency
choices made by the manufacturer and to instead elevate human safety. But
if the federal government specifies how a product is to be manufactured,
making production choices that are susceptible to analysis as policy deci-
sions under exigent circumstances, the courts are not empowered to evalu-
ate the wisdom of the judgments made by the government.8
4. CONG. GLOBE, 37TH CONG., 2D SESS. app. at 2 (1862) (asking Congress to give the then-
Court of Claims the power to enter a final judgment on contract claims against the United States).
5. 3 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 19.4, at 1435 (4th ed. 2002).
6. See ARTHUR LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW §§ 103.02–.03 (2007)
(describing the intentional acts or injury exception to workers’ compensation immunity for the
employer as adopted in many states).
7. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (2010) (excluding from the Federal Tort Claims Act “[a]ny claim
arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during
time of war”); see also Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 141–46 (1950) (holding that claims
by military personnel for injuries sustained incident to service should be excluded from the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act). For a general discussion of the Feres doctrine, see SISK, LITIGATION, supra
note *, § 3.08(c), at 177–87. For a defense of the Feres doctrine, see Paul Figley, In Defense of
Feres: An Unfairly Maligned Opinion, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 393 (2010).
8. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 41 (1953) (holding that the government was
immune from liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act for death and injury resulting from
explosion of fertilizer produced by government specification for shipment to war-torn regions,
saying that the policy choices on methods of manufacture were not the kind of decision “which
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The stream of legal history is flowing ever more forcefully in the di-
rection of affording recovery in court against the United States government
for tort and tort-like injuries. But, here and there, levies, dikes, and over-
flow channels still control or divert the course of the stream, protecting
against excessive public liability or interference by the judicial branch with
the political choices made by democratically elected officials or their ap-
pointees in the legislative and executive branches. Thus, when we study the
federal government’s liability for damages in court for common-law or con-
stitutional torts, we also explore the proper limits on the courts in second-
guessing the actions of the political branches.
In the end, we may all agree with the broad propositions that the gov-
ernment should be responsive to claims by injured persons alleging negli-
gence by government actors, while subjecting court access to prudential
constraints to protect public policy. “What is needed,” argued the late ad-
ministrative law scholar Kenneth Culp Davis, “is a much better balance
between the public interest in the effectiveness of governmental programs
and private interests.”9
This symposium asked the participants to take on those hard questions,
offer insight into the responses of the federal government to accusations in
court of official wrongdoing, and help us to better understand the judicial
holdings, statutes, and legal doctrine governing common-law and constitu-
tional tort liability for the federal government itself or individual federal
government officials. The “better balance” asked for by Professor Davis
may still elude us, but our understanding will be enhanced by the quality of
the dialogue inspired by the symposium participants.
I. COMMON-LAW TORTS: THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
A. The Origins, Purpose, and Scope of the Federal Tort Claims Act
Before 1946, the only means of recovery from the government for in-
jury in tort was a private bill enacted by Congress through the ordinary
legislative process. As a matter both of equity to citizens suffering personal
injury through government operations and to relieve itself of the burden of
considering a multitude of private bills,10 Congress finally passed the Fed-
the courts, under the Act, are empowered to cite as ‘negligence’”); In re Joint E. & S. Dist.
Asbestos Litig., 891 F.2d 31, 33–38 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that the United States was immune
from liability under the Suits in Admiralty Act for using existing standards for shipbuilding that
included asbestos insulation as part of an emergency merchant shipbuilding program during
World War II). On the Dalehite case generally, see Gregory C. Sisk, The Inevitability of Federal
Sovereign Immunity, 55 VILL. L. REV. 899, 908–22 (2010).
9. Kenneth Culp Davis, Sovereign Immunity Must Go, 22 ADMIN. L. REV. 383, 395 (1970).
10. For a succinct history of the Federal Tort Claims Act legislation and congressional pur-
pose, see Professor Paul Figley’s contribution to this symposium, Ethical Intersections & the
Federal Tort Claims Act: An Approach for Government Attorneys, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 347,
347–74 (2001).
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eral Tort Claims Act (FTCA) in 1946.11 As the Supreme Court later
explained:
[The FTCA] was the offspring of a feeling that the Government
should assume the obligation to pay damages for the misfeasance
of employees in carrying out its work. And the private bill device
was notoriously clumsy. Some simplified recovery procedure for
the mass of claims was imperative. This Act was Congress’ solu-
tion, affording instead easy and simple access to the federal courts
for torts within its scope.12
At the time of its enactment, Congress contemplated compensation
under the FTCA to those injured by the government through “ordinary com-
mon-law torts.”13 The most often-cited example for appropriate governmen-
tal liability in the legislative history was that of “negligence in the operation
of vehicles.”14 While injuries resulting from car accidents remain a com-
mon basis for resort to this statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, contro-
versies arising under the FTCA today frequently involve governmental
conduct rather different than mundane operation of a motor vehicle and
invoke theories of tort liability that have substantially evolved and ex-
panded since 1946.
Lawsuits under the FTCA have challenged the regulatory approval of
the polio vaccine by the Food and Drug Administration,15 the alleged negli-
gence of federal mine inspectors in failing to discover non-compliance with
regulatory safety requirements before a mine accident,16 and a multi-bil-
lion-dollar lawsuit alleging that the negligence of the Army Corps of Engi-
neers in failing to seek congressional appropriations to upgrade a navigation
channel adjacent to New Orleans was responsible for exacerbating the dam-
age caused by Hurricane Katrina.17
Because the FTCA is simultaneously expansive in scope and subject to
significant procedural and substantive limitations, the role of the govern-
ment lawyer in defending against FTCA claims becomes one of wise and
11. Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) of 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842.
12. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 24–25.
13. Id. at 28.
14. H.R. REP. NO. 76-2428, at 3 (1940); see Tort Claims: Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R.
6463 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong. 66 (1942); Tort Claims Against the
United States: Hearings on H.R. 7236 Before the Subcomm. No. 1 of the H. Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 76th Cong. 7, 16, 17 (1940); Tort Claims Against the United States: Hearings on S. 2690
Before the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 76th Cong. 9 (1940); 86 CONG. REC.
12,024 (1940); 69 CONG. REC. 2192, 2193, 3118 (1928); see also Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 28 (citing
the legislative reports and noting that car accident cases were the kind of ordinary tort
“[u]ppermost in the collective mind of Congress”).
15. See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988).
16. See United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43 (2005).
17. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 647 F.Supp.2d 644 (E.D. La. 2009),
appeal docketed, No. 10-30249 (5th Cir.); see also Robert C. Longstreth, Longstreth Reflects on
Two Years of Hurricane Katrina Litigation Against the US, 2008 Emerging Issues 1487 (Dec. 13,
2007).
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ethical public administration. As Professor Paul Figley observes in his con-
tribution to this symposium, “[a] swirl of competing interests results from
the structure of the FTCA, the deep pocket it grants successful claimants,
the complete immunity it provides some tortfeasors, and the methods Con-
gress chose for paying settlements and judgments awarded under its aus-
pices.”18 In Ethical Intersections & the Federal Tort Claims Act: An
Approach for Government Attorneys, Figley suggests that the government
lawyer’s ethical responsibilities should be informed by the underlying con-
gressional purposes in enacting the FTCA: “to end the inefficient, burden-
some, and unjust system of resolving tort claims through legislative private
relief bills, and to create a system that provided compensation to individuals
injured by government negligence without damaging the efficient operation
of government or unduly taxing the public treasury.”19 Thus, to uphold
Congress’s desire that tort claims against the government be resolved under
the FTCA, the government lawyer should advise claimants of procedural
requirements and approaching deadlines to enable them to bring timely
claims, even though the result of such warnings may be to subject the gov-
ernment to compensatory liability under the FTCA.20 With respect to the
substantive limits of the FTCA, however, to ensure equal treatment of all
claimants, Figley contends that the government lawyer “in every case
[should] vigorously raise each defense that is reasonably supported by the
facts and the law.”21
B. Standards for Imposing Liability Under the Federal Tort Claims Act
Sections 1346(b) and 2674 of Title 28 of the United States Code set
out the basic parameters of the statutory waiver of federal sovereign immu-
nity for tort liability under the FTCA: The United States is liable in tort—
1) for personal injury, death, or property damage,
2) caused by negligent or wrongful acts or omissions,
3) by a government employee acting within the scope of his of-
fice or employment,
4) in the same manner and to the same extent as a private person
under like circumstances,
5) in accordance with the law of the place (state) where the act or
omission occurred, and
6) for money damages, but not for interest before judgment or for
punitive damages.22
18. Figley, supra note 10, at 348. R
19. Id. at 371.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674 (2010). On these standards for FTCA liability, see gener-
ally SISK, LITIGATION, supra note *, § 3.05, at 124–40.
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The FTCA does not create any new causes of action nor does it formu-
late federal rules of substantive tort law. Instead, as the Supreme Court
explained in Richards v. United States,23 Congress chose “to build upon the
legal relationships formulated and characterized by the States” with respect
to principles of tort law.24 Accordingly, under § 1346(b)(1), the United
States is liable under the FTCA when “a private person[ ] would be liable to
the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omis-
sion occurred.”25 The fundamental principle, then, is that the tort claim al-
leged must be one that the law of the pertinent state recognizes.26
Exclusive jurisdiction over suits brought under the FTCA is given to
the United States District Courts.27 The “United States” is the proper and
sole defendant to a suit under the FTCA, not a federal agency or officer.28
As with most other actions authorized against the federal government,
FTCA claims are tried to the court without a jury.29
C. The Discretionary Function Exception
While the FTCA does waive federal sovereign immunity for tort
claims generally, the United States remains the beneficiary of several spe-
cial rules and protections, notably: restrictions on the standards of liability
(such as the exclusion of strict liability);30 numerous defined exceptions to
liability that bar certain types of claims (such as claims for assault, libel,
misrepresentation, and interference with contract)31 or preclude liability
arising out of certain governmental activities (including discretionary or
policymaking functions,32 transmission of mail,33 and military combat34);
restrictions on damages available (precluding prejudgment interest and pu-
nitive damages);35 and the exclusion of certain categories of people from
eligibility to seek a damages remedy under the FTCA (federal civilian em-
ployees covered by the Federal Employees Compensation Act36 and mili-
tary servicemembers injured incident to service37).38
23. 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
24. Id. at 7.
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).
26. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 23 (1980).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).
28. See id. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2674.
29. Id. § 2402.
30. See Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 797–803 (1972) (construing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1),
making the government liable for the “negligent or wrongful act or omission” of any government
employee, as encompassing only fault-based causes of action, such as negligence or intentional
wrongdoing).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).
32. Id. § 2680(a).
33. Id. § 2680(b).
34. Id. § 2680(j).
35. Id. § 2674.
36. Federal Employees Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (2010).
37. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 141–46 (1950).
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In sum, the bar of sovereign immunity is preserved under these speci-
fied circumstances. Not surprisingly, the applicability of an exception often
is the centerpoint of contention in FTCA litigation, and more than one of
our symposium participants addressed these exceptions.
The first exception listed in § 2680(a),39 and the most important (in
terms of frequency of assertion by the government, successfully more often
than not) is the discretionary function exception. Subsection 2680(a) has
two parts or exceptions. First, the subsection excludes liability based upon
“an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care,
in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or
regulation be valid.”40 Claims of injury arising out of an allegedly invalid
statute or regulation do not give rise to tort liability for the government; the
enactment of a statute or promulgation of a regulation cannot be character-
ized as a negligent act of governance. Challenges to a statute or regulation
must be made through the political process or through a court petition to
strike down the statute or regulation by a constitutional attack or judicial
review of administrative action. A challenge to the validity of a statute or
regulation may not be made through the vehicle of a tort action. This first
phrase of § 2680(a) has not presented difficult issues of interpretation or
application.
The second part of § 2680(a) immunizes the government from liability
based upon an employee’s exercise or failure to exercise a “discretionary
function or duty . . . whether or not the discretion involved be abused.”41
This second phrase, commonly cited as the “discretionary function excep-
tion,” is the subject of ongoing debate as to what falls within its scope.
As one of the more recent in a long series of decisions that began in
1953, the Supreme Court’s 1988 decision in Berkovitz v. United States42
articulated a two-pronged test for the discretionary function exception:
First, the discretionary function exception is not implicated at all unless
there is room for discretion by government employees.43 If a statute, regula-
tion, or (uncodified) policy specifically prescribes a particular course of ac-
tion, then no discretion exists, and consequently, the exception has no
application.44 Second, when there is room for discretion, the question re-
mains whether the discretion exercised was that type intended to be pro-
tected by the exception—that is, involves the permissible exercise of policy
judgment.45
38. For a general discussion of each of these limitations and exceptions, see generally SISK,
LITIGATION, supra note *, §§ 3.05–.08, at 124–86.
39. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. 486 U.S. 531 (1988).
43. Id. at 536, 546–47.
44. See id. at 536.
45. See id.
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In arguing for something like the discretionary function exception, the
eminent scholar of administrative law, Louis Jaffe, wrote that “a court can-
not undertake to determine whether complex governmental decisions are
‘reasonable.’”46  “An attempt to transmute in the alembic of negligence
these competing considerations [of costs, alternatives, risks, and public in-
terest] into a judgment of ‘reasonableness’” Jaffe argued, would only con-
firm the unsuitability of the judicial process for such matters.47 In other
words, if the courts were to accept common-law review on the merits of an
allegedly negligent or otherwise wrongful governmental action that hinges
on disputed questions of policy, the traditional legal standard of reasonable-
ness could too easily shade into an evaluation of political wisdom.
The discretionary function exception may also be the most controver-
sial of the exceptions. As our symposium plenary keynote speaker, Profes-
sor Peter Schuck, has written previously in an article co-authored by
Professor James Park, “even the most routine ministerial action by the low-
est-level employee can be said to involve some judgment or choice,” and if
the exception encompasses “all actions as to which the actor had such
choices, it would literally swallow the FTCA’s general waiver of immu-
nity.”48 Thus, they argue, because “even the most routine agency action can
always be linked to some general policy concern,” broad justifications of-
fered by the government for decisions, such as limited financial resources,
are “too universal to constitute a policy judgment that triggers the”
exception.49
Still, the Supreme Court outlined a very broad scope for the discretion-
ary function exception in United States v. Gaubert,50 instructing that the
analysis is to be focused on “the nature of the actions taken and on whether
they are susceptible to policy analysis.”51 Thus, under the Court’s FTCA
doctrine, the government need not show that government officials con-
sciously balanced policy considerations but only that the type of decision is
“susceptible to policy analysis” for the exception to apply and immunity
from tort liability to attach. If the government offers a purported policy
justification, even post hoc, may the court re-characterize the government
action as mundane conduct subject to liability without usurping the govern-
ment’s policy-making role? And, yet, if the government too readily asserts
budgetary costs or aesthetic concerns to cast the cloak of immunity over
garden-variety government conduct, wouldn’t nearly every governmental
choice be covered with immunity?
46. Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L.
REV. 209, 236 (1963).
47. Id.
48. Peter H. Schuck & James J. Park, The Discretionary Function Exception in the Second
Circuit, 20 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 55, 65 (2000).
49. Id. at 65–66.
50. 499 U.S. 315 (1991).
51. Id. at 325.
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In his contribution to this symposium, Judge Robert Longstreth, who
is also the author of a multi-volume treatise on the FTCA, asks whether the
judicial decision on application of the discretionary function exception may
be influenced by the judge’s policy preferences regarding the government’s
immunity from suit.52 In Does the Two-Prong Test for Determining Appli-
cability of the Discretionary Function Exception Provide Guidance to
Lower Courts Sufficient to Avoid Judicial Partisanship, Longstreth uses
the political party of the nominating president as a proxy for a judge’s atti-
tude, postulating that Republican-nominated judges may be more likely to
defer to the actions of government and thus approve immunity, while Dem-
ocratic-nominated judges may be more likely to approve compensation for
injured parties and thus decline to find immunity.53 Examining 245 judicial
rulings in cases between January 1, 2009, and February 18, 2011, Long-
streth found that Republican-nominated judges were more likely than Dem-
ocratic-nominated judges by a margin of 12.6 percent to hold that the
discretionary function exception barred a claim, with nearly all of that dif-
ference attributable to application of the second susceptible-to-policy-analy-
sis prong.54 Still, because “in the overwhelming majority of cases reviewed,
the partisan affiliation of the decision maker did not affect the outcome of
the case,” Longstreth concludes that present and proposed alternative tests
for the application of the discretionary function exception should be “con-
sidered on their own merits, rather than as tools necessary to achieve greater
consistency.”55
D. The Intentional Tort Exception
Among the other various exceptions to FTCA liability, § 2680(h) of
Title 28 of the United States Code excludes “[a]ny claim arising out of
52. Robert C. Longstreth, Does the Two-Prong Test for Determining Applicability of the
Discretionary Function Exception Provide Guidance to Lower Courts Sufficient to Avoid Judicial
Partisanship?, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 398, 398–416 (2011).
53. Id. at 399.
54. Id. at 405–06. Judge Longstreth’s finding of a frequency margin of 12.6 percent between
judges nominated by presidents of the opposing parties appears comparable to those in empirical
studies of the federal courts. In reporting a recent study on judicial decision-making, my co-author
and I referred to “the typical 10 percent (or less) margin in outcomes reached by Republican-
appointed compared to Democratic-appointed judges found in empirical studies of the federal
courts that include a variety of case types, even when those cases are likely to have an ideological
flavor and only published opinions are examined.” Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Ideology
“All the Way Down”? An Empirical Study of Establishment Clause Decisions in the Federal
Courts, MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHKADE, LISA M.
ELLMAN & ANDRES SAWICKI, ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? 8–10, 12–13 (2006) (finding that Demo-
cratic-appointed federal appellate judges cast “stereotypically liberal” votes about twelve percent
more of the time than Republican-appointed judges, on “a number of controversial issues that
seem especially likely to reveal divisions”); C.K. ROWLAND & ROBERT A. CARP, POLITICS AND
JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 34 (1996) (finding a difference of 10 to 13 percent
between Democratic and Republican cases for all types of cases).
55. Longstreth, supra note 52, at 408. R
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assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution,
abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference
with contract rights.”56 This exception, which includes most intentional
torts (but perhaps not all, as trespass, conversion, invasion of privacy, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress are not listed), demonstrates that
the FTCA falls far short of a complete waiver of the federal government’s
sovereign immunity in tort. As Judge Robert Longstreth has written in his
treatise on the FTCA, through this exception, “eleven familiar torts”—“a
very considerable portion of the law of torts”—have been removed alto-
gether from the government’s consent to suit.57
Among these intentional torts, the assault and battery exception has
drawn the most attention from the courts.58 In Sheridan v. United States,59 a
majority of the Supreme Court ruled that certain independent claims of neg-
ligence may be maintained notwithstanding an underlying assault or bat-
tery. In Sheridan, after his shift as a naval medical aide at the Bethesda
Naval Hospital, an intoxicated off-duty serviceman fired rifle shots into a
public street, striking the plaintiffs’ car and injuring them.60 The Court held
that, at least in some circumstances, “the negligence of other Government
employees who allowed a foreseeable assault and battery to occur may fur-
nish a basis for Government liability that is entirely independent” of the
assaulting person’s employment status and thus is not simply imposition of
vicarious liability against the government for assault and battery by that
employee.61 In the Sheridan case, the plaintiff’s state-law cause of action
against the United States was grounded on the Good Samaritan doctrine,
under which the government allegedly had undertaken to protect the public
and then negligently failed to uphold that duty.62 Because the rifle-firing
serviceman in Sheridan was off-duty—that is, was not acting within the
scope of employment—at the time of the episode, the Court held that the
government was no more protected from liability for its negligent failure to
protect the public than if the assailant “had been an unemployed civilian
patient or visitor in the hospital.”63
In the aftermath of Sheridan, uncertainty lingers as to whether a claim
against the federal government for negligent hiring, training, or supervision
of an employee who commits an intentional tort, such as an assault and
battery, falls within the exception. Justice Kennedy, in a separate concur-
rence in Sheridan, specifically carved out such negligent employment
56. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2010).
57. 2 LESTER S. JAYSON & ROBERT C. LONGSTRETH, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS
§§ 13.06[1][a], [b] (2010).
58. See SISK, LITIGATION, supra note *, § 3.06(d), at 156–62.
59. 487 U.S. 392 (1988).
60. Id. at 393–95.
61. Id. at 401.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 402.
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claims as barred.64 The three dissenting justices in Sheridan expressed the
hope that “the courts will preserve at least this core of the assault and bat-
tery exception.”65 By contrast, the Sheridan majority expressly declined to
decide “whether negligent hiring, negligent supervision, or negligent train-
ing may ever provide the basis for liability under the FTCA for a foresee-
able assault or battery by a Government employee.”66
The lower courts are divided on this issue.67 In Bennett v. United
States,68 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found the
intentional tort exception inapplicable to the case of sexual abuse of chil-
dren by a federal employee at a federally-run day care center. In a subse-
quent decision, the Ninth Circuit explained that this ruling meant that “the
assault and battery exception does not immunize the Government from lia-
bility for negligently hiring and supervising an employee.”69 In approval of
the Ninth Circuit approach, one commentator argues that “[r]espondeat su-
perior claims, which are based on vicarious liability and are barred by the
assault and battery exception, are readily distinguishable from claims based
on negligent hiring, retention and supervision,” as the latter require proof of
the employer’s independent negligence.70
By contrast, most courts that have addressed the question post-Sheri-
dan have barred claims that are based on the employment relationship, such
as negligent hiring or supervision.71 One district court explained the line
between exclusion under the intentional tort exception and viability as a
claim under the FTCA as reflecting “the distinction between tort theories of
liability that depend upon an employment relationship (e.g., negligent hir-
ing or supervision) and those that do not (e.g., premises liability).”72 Thus,
if the plaintiff seeks to hold the United States liable on theories independent
of the employment relationship, such as the duty to maintain safe premises
and guard persons entering a government facility from being attacked by
others, then FTCA liability is not precluded by the exception. But, of
course, claims may arise at a place other than a government facility or the
64. Id. at 406–08 (1988) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
65. Id. at 411 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 403 n.8.
67. See generally SISK, LITIGATION, supra note *, § 3.06(d)(3), at 161–62.
68. 803 F.2d 1502, 1502–05 (9th Cir. 1986).
69. Brock v. United States, 64 F.3d 1421, 1425 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Senger v. United
States, 103 F.3d 1437, 1442 (9th Cir. 1996).
70. Rebecca L. Andrews, Comment, So the Army Hired an Ax-Murderer: The Assault and
Battery Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act Does Not Bar Suits for Negligent Hiring, Reten-
tion and Supervision, 78 WASH. L. REV. 161, 192–93 (2003).
71. See, e.g., Billingsley v. United States, 251 F.3d 696, 698 (8th Cir. 2001); Leleux v.
United States, 178 F.3d 750, 756–58 & n.5 (5th Cir. 1999); Martinez v. United States, 311 F.
Supp. 2d 1274, 1279 (D. N.M. 2004); Ryan v. United States, 156 F. Supp. 2d 900, 906–07 (N.D.
Ill. 2001); Lilly v. United States, 141 F. Supp. 2d 626, 628–29 (S.D. W. Va. 2001), aff’d, 22 Fed.
Appx. 293 (4th Cir. 2001); Pottle v. United States, 918 F. Supp. 843, 847–48 (D. N.J. 1996).
72. Verran v. United States, 305 F. Supp. 2d 765, 776 (E.D. Mich. 2004).
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common-law tort rules that specify when a property owner has a special
duty to protect people against intentional wrongdoing may not apply in a
case. Under the majority approach in the federal courts, in such a case
where a premises liability or similar general duty theory is unavailable, the
plaintiff cannot alternatively assert that the government had a duty as an
employer to control the conduct of the employee, because this latter theory
runs afoul of the assault and battery exception.
In Intentional Torts and Other Exceptions to the Federal Tort
Claims Act,73 Assistant United States Attorney David Fuller examines the
various exceptions and limitations to the FTCA, with a special focus on the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), which is not
among those listed in the Intentional Tort Exception of § 2680(h). Although
one federal court of appeals in a footnote summarily rejected this tort as not
actionable under the FTCA,74 and the Supreme Court also in a footnote
termed such a claim to be questionable in light of the general exclusion of
intentional torts from the FTCA,75 the majority of courts of appeals have
viewed the IIED claim as falling outside of the statutory exception, at least
under some circumstances.76 As Fuller explains, the rule widely recognized
and applied by courts in considering IIED claims brought pursuant to the
FTCA77 is that (1) conduct that would constitute another excluded tort, such
as assault or battery, is barred, even if it could alternatively be framed as
constituting a non-excluded tort, such as IIED, but (2) any other aspect of
that conduct that would not in itself constitute an excluded tort is not
barred.78 Thus, for example, sexual battery and molestation of an FTCA
plaintiff by a government employee would be barred by the battery excep-
tion in the FTCA (even though the plaintiff undoubtedly suffered emotional
distress as a result), but the employee’s demands for sexual favors, which
did not involve touching and thus were not a battery, could be the basis for
a claim of IIED and not be barred by any FTCA exception.79 Because draw-
ing these lines can be difficult, Fuller observes that “courts have seemingly
reached widely divergent conclusions on whether IIED claims fall within
one of the many FTCA exclusions.”80
73. David W. Fuller, Intentional Torts and Other Exceptions to the Federal Tort Claims Act,
8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 375, 375–97 (2011).
74. Denson v. United States, 574 F.3d 1318, 1345 & n.67 (11th Cir. 2009).
75. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 420–22 n.19 (2002).
76. See, e.g., Limone v. United States, 579 F.3d 79, 92–93 (1st Cir. 2009); Estate of
Trentadue ex rel. Aguilar v. United States, 397 F.3d 840, 858–59 (10th Cir. 2005); Raz v. United
States, 343 F.3d 945 (8th Cir. 2003); Truman v. United States, 26 F.3d 592, 596–97 (5th Cir.
1994); Kohn v. United States, 680 F.2d 922, 924 (2d Cir. 1982).
77. Fuller, supra note 73, at 392.
78. See Sheehan v. United States, 896 F.2d 1168, 1171 (9th Cir. 1990).
79. See Xue Lu v. Powell, 621 F.3d 944, 950 (9th Cir. 2010).
80. Fuller, supra note 73, at 393.
31446-ust_8-3 Sheet No. 10 Side A      05/11/2012   16:54:17
31446-ust_8-3 Sheet No. 10 Side A      05/11/2012   16:54:17
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\8-3\UST301.txt unknown Seq: 13 11-MAY-12 16:29
2011] FOREWORD: OFFICIAL WRONGDOING 307
E. Personal Liability Suits Against Federal Employees, the Westfall Act,
the Federal Tort Claims Act, and Constitutional Tort Claims
Under § 1346(b)(1) of Title 28 of the United States Code, the govern-
ment is liable for tortious acts committed by “any employee of the Govern-
ment while acting within the scope of his office or employment.”81 If a
federal employee commits a tort in his or her personal capacity, then he or
she is responsible individually and subject to personal liability.82 But when
a government employee was acting within the scope of employment at the
time of an allegedly tortious incident, then by statute the United States is to
be substituted as the sole defendant to an FTCA suit, and the suit may no
longer proceed against the government employee individually.
Under the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensa-
tion Act (commonly known as the Westfall Act), the remedy against the
United States under the FTCA “is exclusive of any other civil action or
proceeding for money damages by reason of the same subject matter against
the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim . . . .”83 Thus, the
Westfall Act grants personal immunity from tort liability to government
employees when acting within the scope of employment. Moreover, the
Westfall Act converts a lawsuit for money damages against a federal em-
ployee acting within the scope of employment into a suit under the FTCA
against the United States.  If such a suit is filed in state court, it will be
removed to federal district court.84
In sum, the Westfall Act eliminates ordinary common-law suits against
federal employees when acting within the scope of employment but does
provide the plaintiff with a substitute defendant (the United States) against
which to maintain the tort action.
However, as Professors Kenneth Culp Davis and Richard Pierce
pointed out many years ago, the Westfall Act’s transfer of liability from the
individual government employee to the government “is seriously incom-
plete because federal employees remain potentially liable for constitutional
torts, and victims of some intentional torts continue to have no remedy
against the government.”85
First, as discussed below in Part II of this Foreword, the Supreme
Court under certain circumstances has implied private actions against fed-
eral employees for money damages premised on violations of constitutional
rights. In terms of whether to substitute the United States as the defendant
81. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006); see also id. § 2675 (using same language in context of
FTCA administrative claim).
82. SISK, LITIGATION, supra note *, § 5.06(a), at 359.
83. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (2006). For more on the scope of this Judgment Bar and its
application to constitutional as well as common-law tort claims, see infra Part III.
84. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2).
85. KENNETH C. DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 19.3, at
227 (3d ed. 1994).
31446-ust_8-3 Sheet No. 10 Side B      05/11/2012   16:54:17
31446-ust_8-3 Sheet No. 10 Side B      05/11/2012   16:54:17
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\8-3\UST301.txt unknown Seq: 14 11-MAY-12 16:29
308 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:3
and confer personal immunity on the government employee in such suits,
the Westfall Act expressly excepts civil actions against government em-
ployees “brought for a violation of the Constitution of the United
States . . . .”86 Thus, the so-called Bivens suit is not preempted by the
Westfall Act in the same way that a common-law tort suit against an em-
ployee acting within the scope of employment is superseded by a suit
against the United States.
Second, as the Supreme Court held in Gutierrez de Martinez v.
Lamagno,87 although the Westfall Act substitutes the United States as the
defendant, “[i]f . . . an exception to the FTCA shields the United States
from suit, the plaintiff may be left without a tort action against any party.”88
Accordingly, a party seeking recovery for wrongful death, injury, or prop-
erty damage based on an employee’s tortious action while acting in the
scope of employment is limited to a suit against the United States. The
party may not recover from the individual employee, even if the FTCA suit
fails because of special defenses available only to the federal government.89
If the plaintiff finds that the United States is not amenable to liability
due to an exception in the FTCA, that plaintiff understandably would wish
to challenge the Attorney General’s certification and seek to have the indi-
vidual employee reinstated as the defendant. In Gutierrez de Martinez, the
Court understood Congress’s purpose in the Westfall Act as merely to re-
store immunity from common-law torts to federal employees, not to make
the Attorney General “the final arbiter” of the scope-of-employment is-
sue.90 Under Gutierrez de Martinez, the Attorney General’s certification of
the scope of employment, for the purposes of extending immunity to the
employee and substituting the United States as the sole defendant, is re-
viewable in federal court.91
As with the determination of scope of employment under the FTCA
for purposes of alleging respondeat superior liability on the part of the
United States, state law provides the general principles for determining
whether the employee acted within the scope of the federal office or posi-
tion for purposes of the Westfall Act. The United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit has explained: “Federal law determines whether a per-
son is a federal employee and defines the nature and contours of his official
responsibilities; but the law of the state in which the tortious act allegedly
86. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(A).
87. 515 U.S. 417 (1995).
88. Id. at 420.
89. United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160, 166–67 (1991).
90. 515 U.S. at 425–26.
91. Id. at 434.
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occurred determines whether the employee was acting within the scope of
those responsibilities.”92
State legal standards regarding the scope of employment have evolved
in the course of determining when the employer is appropriately held re-
sponsible under the respondeat superior doctrine for the wrongdoing of an
employee. As I have written previously:
[O]ver time, state law rules have tended to broaden the scope of
employment concept so as to expand employer accountability to
others for the misdeeds of employees. Ironically—or some might
say, perversely—application of these state law expectations to the
peculiar Westfall Act context occasionally may have precisely the
opposite effect. If the federal employee is found to have acted
within the scope of employment, he or she individually will be
immune from liability. And if the federal government, as the sub-
stituted sole defendant, successfully invokes an exception to
FTCA liability, it too will enjoy immunity from liability. Thus,
rather than expanding tort liability and enhancing the opportunity
for plaintiffs to sue a financially-responsible defendant—as gen-
erally was the intent behind state court decisions broadening the
reach of respondeat superior in recent decades—application of
liberal state scope-of-employment rules sometimes may operate
to narrow tort liability in the federal employee/federal govern-
ment context. Of course, in the typical case involving garden-va-
riety negligence occurring inside the nation’s borders, substituting
the United States as the defendant under the FTCA leaves the
plaintiff with a legally-amenable and financially-responsible de-
fendant comfortably in place.93
“Every year,” Senior Department of Justice Counsel Paul Michael
Brown writes, “plaintiffs name thousands of current or former federal em-
ployees as defendants in civil suits, asserting claims against them in their
individual capacity and seeking to recover money damages from their per-
sonal assets.”94 In Personal Liability Tort Litigation Against Federal Em-
ployees—A Primer, Brown explains that the Department of Justice has long
taken the position that “personal liability tort claims against federal employ-
ees implicate the interests of the United States,” and, accordingly, Depart-
ment of Justice attorneys are assigned to defend these claims.95 Under
Department of Justice guidelines, “individual capacity representation” is
provided if (1) the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred within the
92. Lyons v. Brown, 158 F.3d 605, 609 (1st Cir. 1998); see also Gutierrez de Martinez v.
Drug Enforcement Admin., 111 F.3d 1148, 1156 (4th Cir. 1997) (on remand from Supreme
Court); RMI Titanium Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 78 F.3d 1125, 1143 (6th Cir. 1996).
93. SISK, LITIGATION, supra note *, § 5.06(c)(4), at 369.
94. Paul Michael Brown, Personal Liability Tort Litigation Against Federal Employees—A
Primer, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 329, 329 (2011).
95. Id.
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scope of employment, and (2) it is in the interests of the United States to
assign a Department of Justice lawyer to defend the claim.96
If individual capacity representation is approved, as Brown reports,
then a “full and traditional attorney client relationship” is created, including
protection of privileged communications between the Department of Justice
lawyer and the individual officer.97 Brown advises that “many civil actions
asserting these claims become extremely complex procedurally” because
some of these claims against individual officers may eventually be trans-
formed into suits against the sovereign, because some raise special ques-
tions of constitutional scope and immunity from suit, and because a variety
of defenses are typically available.98
II. CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS: BIVENS SUITS
Before Congress began enacting statutory waivers of the federal gov-
ernment’s sovereign immunity in the latter part of the nineteenth and into
the twentieth centuries, a lawsuit framed against the individual government
officer or employee—based upon a common-law cause of action in tort or
contract—was the primary means by which to obtain redress against the
government in court.99 During this period, the Supreme Court indulged the
fiction that a suit targeted at actions by the government collectively none-
theless could avoid the bar of sovereign immunity by being plead against an
individual government officer.100 Eventually, as the doctrine of federal sov-
ereign immunity matured into its present form, the Supreme Court dis-
pensed with this fiction and recognized a suit against a federal officer acting
within the scope of his or her statutory authority as effectively running
against the sovereign United States itself.101 Moreover, with the advent of
the era of statutory waivers of federal sovereign immunity, governmental
amenability to suit expanded and the need for alternative avenues against
governmental agents subsided.
Accordingly, in the modern era, with respect to non-constitutional
claims, suits framed against individual officers or employees play a much
reduced role. When a plaintiff seeks specific or equitable-type relief against
the federal government, the Administrative Procedure Act102 allows the suit
to go forward either against the federal officer in his or her official capacity
or against the United States directly. When a plaintiff seeks recovery of
money damages for common-law torts, Congress has granted statutory im-
96. Id. at 330.
97. Id. (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 50.15(a)(3) (2011)).
98. Id. at 346.
99. See generally Gregory C. Sisk, A Primer on the Doctrine of Federal Sovereign Immunity,
58 OKLA. L. REV. 439, 446–51 (2005).
100. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
101. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
102. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).
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munity to federal employees acting within the scope of employment. Such a
tort suit instead must proceed with the United States substituted as the sole
defendant to a suit under the FTCA.103
Still, even today, an injured party seeking certain types of relief for
certain kinds of harms may be restricted to a remedy against a government
officer. Importantly, a plaintiff suing for money damages against an indi-
vidual federal officer for violation of constitutionally-protected rights has a
potential cause of action directly under the Constitution as implied by the
Supreme Court in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics.104
However, even in this context, the conventional wisdom today is that
the remedy against an individual government officer often is more theoreti-
cal than real. The Supreme Court increasingly is reluctant to extend a judi-
cially-implied cause of action for damages based on constitutional
violations into new contexts. The Court frequently has found that the Bivens
remedy has been displaced by alternative statutory schemes. Together with
the Court’s invigoration of the defense of qualified immunity for govern-
ment officers, these judicial developments have been understood to make
successful Bivens suits rather few in number. But, as recent scholarship
reveals, Bivens claims focused on traditional abuses of constitutional au-
thority by law enforcement—typically claims of unlawful searches and
seizures or cruel and unusual prison conditions—meet with greater success.
A. The Origins of the Bivens Claim
That individuals would bring common-law suits for ordinary torts
against individuals who happened to be government employees, even when
those employees were acting within the scope of their government duties,
was inevitable and unremarkable. With respect to ordinary tort suits, the
common law already supplied the cause of action; the only issues have been
whether a suit brought against a federal employee was effectively one
against the United States itself (and thus covered by sovereign immunity)
and whether the defendant’s status as a federal employee afforded a degree
of immunity from suit and liability.
However, it was not inevitable that a federal government employee’s
violation of a constitutional provision would be recognized as the
equivalent of a tort that gives rise to a private remedy in court for money
damages against the individual employee. Indeed, the Constitution does not
expressly speak to the availability of a private cause of action for those
suffering an infringement of constitutional rights, and further does not indi-
cate that individual officers, rather than the government itself, should bear
personal responsibility for upholding constitutional standards at the risk of
103. 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (2006).
104. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
31446-ust_8-3 Sheet No. 12 Side B      05/11/2012   16:54:17
31446-ust_8-3 Sheet No. 12 Side B      05/11/2012   16:54:17
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\8-3\UST301.txt unknown Seq: 18 11-MAY-12 16:29
312 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:3
private liability. Not until some 180 years after ratification of the United
States Constitution did the Supreme Court first recognize a private judicial
action for personal liability against a federal government employee pre-
mised upon a constitutional transgression.
As the factual background to the Supreme Court’s landmark 1971 de-
cision in Bivens,105 agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics had entered
the plaintiff’s apartment, arrested him for narcotics violations, and searched
his apartment. The plaintiff brought suit in federal district court for dam-
ages against the agents, contending that the arrest and search were without
probable cause and without a warrant, in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment of the Constitution.106 Justice Brennan, writing for a five-Justice ma-
jority of the Supreme Court, upheld a cause of action against the federal
agents, acting under color of federal authority, for their alleged violation of
the plaintiff’s constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment.107 Justice
Brennan’s analysis essentially boils down to the principle that a legal rem-
edy should be available for a legal wrong.108 Although, Justice Brennan
admitted, the Fourth Amendment does not “in so many words” provide for
its enforcement by an award of damages, he insisted that the ordinary rem-
edy for invasion of personal liberty interests was damages.109 Three Justices
dissented in Bivens, arguing that the creation of the Bivens remedy was
“judicial legislation,” contending that the subject should have been left to
Congress, and predicting that the Court’s action would choke the courts
with lawsuits.110
After Bivens, the Supreme Court recognized the implied constitutional
remedies in additional contexts and based upon constitutional provisions
beyond the Fourth Amendment. The Court found a right to damages for
employment discrimination in violation of the Fifth Amendment111 and for
injuries to a prisoner under the Eighth Amendment.112 However, these rul-
ings proved to be the high water mark for the Bivens doctrine.
105. 403 U.S. at 389–90. For the “Story of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics,” see symposium participant James E. Pfander’s chapter by that name
in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik, eds. 2009).
106. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 398–90.
107. See id. at 390–97.
108. Id. at 395–97.
109. Id. at 396.
110. Id. at 411–27 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 427–30 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 430
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
111. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 229–49 (1979).
112. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18–25 (1980).
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B. Limitations on Implying a Cause of Action for Constitutional
Violations
In 1983, Professor Peter Schuck described the Bivens remedy as “a
powerful new string to a victim’s bow.”113 But by 1995, Professor Susan
Bandes was lamenting that the promise of remediation for constitutional
violations had been eroded and that “there is little left of the Bivens princi-
ple.”114 What happened in the interim? Since the mid-1980s, as Professor
Richard Pierce explains, the Supreme Court’s opinions “seem to reflect
waning enthusiasm for the Bivens doctrine and increasing willingness to
conclude that available alternative remedies displace the Bivens remedy in
specific contexts.”115
After the initial wave of decisions extending the Bivens remedy, the
Court trimmed the sails of Bivens plaintiffs by finding reasons not to imply
a cause of action for constitutional infractions in other contexts and to defer
to Congress in determining what remedies to make available, if any. Thus,
in Bush v. Lucas,116 the Supreme Court unanimously declined to extend
Bivens to a federal employee’s claim that his superior had violated his First
Amendment free speech rights. The Court found “special factors counsel-
ling hesitation” that militated against creating a new judicial remedy.117 In
essence, the Bush Court regarded the case as a federal personnel matter. The
Court was unwilling to expand upon existing civil service remedies without
some overture from Congress.118
Following Bush, the Supreme Court has been ever more likely to find
“special factors” that militate against extension of this remedy. The Court
has refused to authorize a Bivens action for Social Security beneficiaries
alleging a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in
processing disability benefit claims,119 for military service personnel alleg-
ing injury due to unconstitutional actions of superior officers,120 and, most
recently, for a property owner alleging extortionate tactics by government
employees to coerce the granting of an easement to the government as vio-
lating property rights under the Fifth Amendment.121 In that 2007 decision,
Wilkie v. Robbins, Justices Thomas and Scalia wrote a separate concur-
rence, characterizing “‘Bivens [as] a relic of the heady days in which this
113. PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 42
(1983).
114. Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L. REV.
289, 293–94 (1995).
115. PIERCE, supra note 5, § 19.5, at 1855. R
116. 462 U.S. 367, 368–80 (1983).
117. Id. at 378.
118. See id. at 380–90.
119. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 414–29 (1988).
120. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 684 (1987); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296,
304 (1983).
121. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007).
31446-ust_8-3 Sheet No. 13 Side B      05/11/2012   16:54:17
31446-ust_8-3 Sheet No. 13 Side B      05/11/2012   16:54:17
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\8-3\UST301.txt unknown Seq: 20 11-MAY-12 16:29
314 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:3
Court assumed common-law powers to create causes of action,’” and thus
should be confined to its precise circumstances.122
In his contribution to the symposium, Professor Stephen Vladeck dis-
putes the characterization of Bivens as “a relic of the heady days” in which
a supposedly activist Supreme Court profligately created private causes of
action for statutory and constitutional wrongs while arrogantly neglecting
legislative intent.123 In Bivens Remedies and the Myth of the “Heady
Days,”124 Vladeck distinguishes between judicial inference of a private
cause of action into a statutory scheme, a question which turns directly on
legislative intent, and judicial implication of an effective remedy for a con-
stitutional wrong, the existence of which “in no way required indicia of
legislative intent.”125 As Vladeck writes, “congressional intent has always
been a linchpin of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence concerning implied
statutory remedies,” given that “Congress’s control over statutory rights is
virtually plenary.”126 At present, the Supreme Court ordinarily demands an
express textual provision for a cause of action for statutory rights.127 By
contrast, in several areas, such as habeas corpus challenges to criminal con-
victions by prisoners, suits to recover state taxes that allegedly were uncon-
stitutionally exacted, or injunctive relief against government officers
allegedly acting in violation of constitutional constraints, the Constitution
does require some type of remedy, including judicial implication of one if
Congress fails to provide it.128 Along the same lines, while the Supreme
Court may conclude that Congress has displaced a Bivens remedy by legis-
latively fashioning an alternative remedial approach, Vladeck observes that
“the Supreme Court has never declined to recognize a Bivens remedy in a
case where the absence of such relief left the plaintiff with no legal remedy
whatsoever.”129
In any event, the Supreme Court, while not overturning Bivens, is now
more likely to defer to legislative action on whether a private damages rem-
edy should be created for recompense against alleged official wrongdoing.
The Court appears to be presumptively receptive to arguments that alterna-
tive statutory remedies—even if incomplete in relief afforded and although
designed very differently from a tort action for money damages—displace
any Bivens constitutional tort cause of action. As Paul Michael Brown
122. Id. at 568 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534
U.S. 61, 75 (2001)).
123. Stephen I. Vladeck, Bivens Remedies and the Myth of the “Heady Days,” 8 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 513, 513 (2011).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 519.
126. Id. at 520.
127. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288 (2001).
128. Vladeck, supra note 123, at 524.
129. Id. at 523 (emphasis added).
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reports in his contribution to this symposium, “[t]he courts of appeal have
been similarly disinclined to infer a Bivens remedy” in recent years.130
C. Qualified Immunity of Federal Officers
When dissenting from the judicial implication of a private right of ac-
tion for damages for constitutional violations against federal officers in Biv-
ens in 1971, Justice Black expressed the fear that the Bivens-type suit
“might deter officials from the proper and honest performance of their du-
ties.”131 A decade later, the Supreme Court agreed unanimously in Harlow
v. Fitzgerald132 that some level of immunity should be available to defend-
ants in Bivens actions because litigation against federal officers diverts offi-
cials from their public responsibilities and may discourage them from
acceptance of office or faithful discharge of their duties. The Court con-
cluded that the proper “balance between the evils” of abuse of office by
government officials and the social costs of litigation (which run against the
innocent as well as the guilty) was best measured by affording qualified, but
not absolute, immunity to executive officials other than the President.133
In his plenary keynote address at the symposium, Professor Peter
Schuck highlights “the important relationship of a governmental entity and
an individual officer’s liability to deterrence—and, equally or more impor-
tant but much less visible, to the risk of over-deterrence.”134 Titling his
contribution, Suing Government Lawyers for Giving Dubious Legal Ad-
vice in a National Security Crisis: Notes on How (Not) to Become a Ba-
nana Republic, Schuck illustrates the main themes of his argument with
references to still-pending Bivens litigation against former Department of
Justice legal advisor John Yoo, who had authored a controversial legal
memorandum requested by the Central Intelligence Agency on the legal
permissibility of certain harsh interrogation methods proposed to be used
against “enemy combatants” captured overseas, a document that critics later
characterized as authorizing the use of torture. Schuck characterizes the liti-
gation as “ill-conceived for at least three distinct reasons: legal principles,
public policy, and professional ethics.”135 He reminds us that the security of
our society, especially in dangerous times, depends on the willingness of
government legal counselors to offer “their best judgment on difficult issues
without having to worry about being dragged into court or disbarred if they
turn out to be wrong or (in the case of criminal prosecution) when a new
130. Brown, supra note 94, at 333.
131. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
429 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting).
132. 457 U.S. 800, 806–14 (1982).
133. Id. at 813–14.
134. Peter H. Schuck, Suing Government Lawyers for Giving Dubious Legal Advice in a Na-
tional Security Crisis: Notes on How (Not) to Become a Banana Republic, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J.
496, 496 (2011).
135. Id. at 503.
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administration arrives in Washington.”136 Qualified immunity from civil li-
ability for official actors, by promoting “vigorous decision-making and ap-
propriate risk-taking” or putting it another way, by discouraging undue
timidity,137 thus benefits us all, and if it also benefits the individual official,
“that is incidental.”138
Under the Supreme Court’s decision in Harlow, the question of
whether qualified immunity covers the defendant official’s conduct turns on
the objective reasonableness of the official’s conduct.139 In his contribution
to this symposium, also discussed earlier in Part I.E of this Foreword, Paul
Michael Brown emphasizes that the test “is whether reasonable officials,
not judges or constitutional scholars, could have thought the defendant’s
conduct was permissible under the Constitution.”140 The crucial inquiry is
whether the official violated “clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”141 Reaffirming the
objective reasonableness test, the Supreme Court said:
Qualified immunity shields an officer from suit when she makes a
decision that, even if constitutionally deficient, reasonably misap-
prehends the law governing the circumstances she confronted.
Because the focus is on whether the officer had fair notice that
her conduct was unlawful, reasonableness is judged against the
backdrop of the law at the time of the conduct. If the law at that
time did not clearly establish that the officer’s conduct would vio-
late the Constitution, the officer should not be subject to liability
or, indeed, even the burdens of litigation.142
As Professor Peter Schuck suggests, the “clearly established” stan-
dard for qualified immunity “may sometimes be difficult to apply—in hard
cases, clarity is in the eye of the beholder—but it does strike roughly the
correct balance between the competing public and private interests.”143
D. The Prospect for Success in Bivens Claims
The conventional wisdom, echoed by many scholars, has been that,
under the Supreme Court’s increasingly skeptical jurisprudence, Bivens
claims are seldom available and are rarely successful. Joining the scholars
quoted previously who fear that the Bivens principle has eroded over the
136. Id. at 508–09.
137. Id. at 510.
138. Id. at 509.
139. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818–19 (1982).
140. Brown, supra note 94, at 336.
141. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
142. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004).
143. Schuck, supra note 134, at 503.
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past couple of decades,144 Professor Laurence Tribe says that “the Bivens
doctrine . . . is on life support with little prospect of recovery.”145
However, an earlier empirical study conducted by another of our sym-
posium participants, Professor Alexander Reinert, found that “Bivens
cases are much more successful than has been assumed by the legal com-
munity, and that in some respects they are nearly as successful as other
kinds of challenges to governmental misconduct.”146  Based on this study of
the outcomes in Bivens cases in five district courts over four years, Reinert
found that classic Bivens-type claims, such as prison condition suits and
suits alleging an unlawful search and seizure in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, prevailed 26 and 34 percent of the time in cases in which the
issue was joined by the filing of an answer to the complaint.147 When the
Bivens claimant is represented by counsel, the rate of success climbs signif-
icantly, to nearly 40 percent overall.148
Thus, while the scope of the Bivens universe of claims may be circum-
scribed, in the wake of such Supreme Court decisions as Bush and Wil-
kie,149 lawsuits challenging egregious misconduct by federal prison officials
and law enforcement and alleging physical harm or direct damage to prop-
erty appear to have moderate success. In sum, the Bivens remedy is more
robust in the context of typical constitutional torts alleging physical abuse
by federal law enforcement or prison guards.
In his contribution to this symposium, Reinert sets the stage for further
research on the availability of the Bivens remedy to a larger universe of
potential claimants by asking whether qualified immunity as a defense for
federal officers plays a major role at the screening stage for lawyers who
are considering whether to file suit.150 In Does Qualified Immunity Matter,
Reinert reports preliminary results from a qualitative survey of experienced
attorneys who had handled multiple Bivens or related suits.151 In summariz-
ing his results, Reinert emphasizes that the surveyed lawyers may not be
representative of all Bivens litigators, the data was not collected in a sys-
tematic manner, and the data are “soft by nature” as based on anecdotal
reports by lawyers.152 Nonetheless, certain clear patterns at least suggest
wider ramifications.
144. See supra notes 114–16 and accompanying text. R
145. Laurence H. Tribe, Death By a Thousand Cuts: Constitutional Wrongs Without a Remedy
After Wilkie v. Robbins, CATO SUP. CT. REV., 2006-07, at 23, 26.
146. Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its Consequences
for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 813 (2010).
147. Id. at 841 n.154.
148. Id. at 839.
149. See supra notes 117–23 and accompanying text.
150. Alexander A. Reinert, Does Qualified Immunity Matter?, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 477,
477–496 (2011).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 491.
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Nearly every lawyer surveyed agreed that “qualified immunity plays a
large role in case selection. Most attorneys seem to select cases to avoid any
possible qualified immunity issues arising in the litigation.”153 Moreover,
the impact of qualified immunity at the screening stage flows not only from
its substantive effect but also from its procedural obstacles, such as the
availability of interlocutory appeal to government officers, which delays
adjudication and thus discourages clients.  Because there is “nearly over-
whelming support for the proposition that qualified immunity considera-
tions matter at the screening stage, and some attorneys consider them
dispositive,”154 Reinert’s results, preliminary though they may be, are wor-
thy of attention and justify continued investigation in future studies.
III. WHETHER TO IMPOSE LIABILITY ON THE GOVERNMENT
OR THE INDIVIDUAL OFFICER
In FDIC v. Meyer,155 the Supreme Court unanimously identified “the
logic of Bivens” as grounded in the responsibility and liability of the indi-
vidual government employee for his or her own constitutional misconduct.
The premise of Bivens, in the Court’s mind at least, is that the individual
agents of the government, rather than the government as an entity, would
have committed the constitutional wrong to the detriment of the plaintiff’s
constitutional right. But isn’t that simply a resurrection of the fictional di-
chotomy between government officers and the government they serve? The
government officer acts as an agent of the government, and the government
can only act through its agents. Why should they not be seen as one and the
same, at least as to those outside the government who suffer constitutional
injury at the hands of a government agent? What are the costs and benefits
of preserving the Bivens remedy as one against the government employee
personally rather than adding or substituting the government as the
defendant?156
A number of commentators have argued that there would be great ad-
vantages in shifting liability for both ordinary and constitutional torts from
public employees to the government itself. Professor Peter Schuck lists a
variety of defects that he sees as flowing from imposition of liability di-
rectly upon officials rather than upon the government: “its propensity to
chill vigorous decisionmaking; to leave deserving victims uncompensated
and losses concentrated; to weaken deterrence; to obscure the morality of
the law; and to generate high system costs.”157 Professor Richard Pierce
contends that “[e]xposing individual government employees to potential
tort liability is particularly likely to produce socially undesirable decision-
153. Id. at 494.
154. Id. at 493.
155. 510 U.S. 471, 484–85 (1994).
156. SISK, LITIGATION, supra note *, § 5.07(g), at 394–97.
157. SCHUCK, supra note 113, at 100.
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making incentives.”158 Because individuals are most likely to fear substan-
tial personal liability (even though most federal employees held liable for
actions within the scope of employment are indemnified), holding govern-
ment employees personally liable for ordinary or constitutional torts may
discourage them from undertaking new initiatives or reforms.
In addition, focusing liability upon government officials, rather than
the government, weakens the claims of those who have been wronged by
government agents. Pierce notes that “sympathy for the plight of the public
employee induces courts to adopt unduly narrow interpretations of constitu-
tional and statutory rights” and “induces juries to resolve close factual dis-
putes in favor of the defendant and to award lower damages.”159 By
contrast, Schuck contends, a governmental liability scheme would ensure
adequate compensation to victims of government misconduct and the elimi-
nation of even the possibility of personal exposure to liability would dissi-
pate some of the chill on vigorous decision-making by government
officials.160 He concludes that “[e]nterprise liability . . . would reduce the
randomness with which particular officials are now sued and held liable,”
which makes actually being held liable for official wrongdoing “seem mor-
ally irrelevant and arbitrary when it does occur.”161
Professor Barbara Armacost has taken the contrary view and generally
has defended the Supreme Court’s resistance to respondeat superior liability
by governmental entities for constitutional violations and its focus upon the
individual conduct of government officials.162 Armacost has contended that
“fault-based, individual liability—in which a particular official is identified
as a ‘constitutional wrongdoer’—serves a moral blaming function that has
independent value regardless of who ultimately bears the financial cost of
liability.”163  Thus, she has concluded, “important moral and societal inter-
ests are vindicated by a regime that makes blameworthy officials personally
liable for their unconstitutional behavior, even if they do not ultimately pay
the judgment.”164
Professor Alexander Reinert strikes something of a middle position.
He suggests a “hybrid form of liability,” in which individual federal em-
ployees would remain the primary defendants but would be allowed “to join
the federal government as a necessary third party defendant where the indi-
vidual defendant can show that the conduct in which she engaged was con-
sistent with and in furtherance of government policy.”165 Thus, court-
158. 3 PIERCE, supra note 5, § 19.2, at 1390. R
159. Id. § 19.2, at 1391–92.
160. SCHUCK, supra note 113, at 101–02.
161. Id. at 102.
162. Barbara E. Armacost, Qualified Immunity: Ignorance Excused, 51 VAND. L. REV. 581,
591–92, 663–76 (1998).
163. Id. at 592.
164. Id. at 670.
165. Reinert, supra note 146, at 849.
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ordered governmental indemnity would shield individual officers in circum-
stances where, in Schuck’s words, they were “little more than an instrument
of impersonal bureaucratic, political, and social processes over which they
have little or no effective control.”166
Under current doctrine, which weaves together judicial implications
and statutory directions, individual government officers are potentially lia-
ble for constitutional torts but are generally immune from common-law
torts committed in the scope of government employment, while the federal
government itself may be sued for common-law torts but enjoys sovereign
immunity from constitutional tort claims for money damages.167 The un-
easy relationship and sometimes peculiar contrast between officer and gov-
ernmental entity liability and immunity are further revealed in the
increasingly expansive interpretation by the lower federal courts of the
reach of the so-called Judgment Bar.
As a general rule, a statutory provision within the FTCA states that if a
judgment is obtained against the United States, then that judgment operates
as a “complete bar” to a suit “by reason of the same subject matter” against
the individual government employee.168 If an injured plaintiff pursues a
claim to judgment against the United States as a governmental entity by
pressing a common-law tort theory under the FTCA, even if the judgment is
adverse to the plaintiff, then every remedy against the individual employee
is precluded, even if framed alternatively as a constitutional tort against the
employee under Bivens. When a case is litigated to a judgment in an FTCA
suit, even if the ruling is that the claim falls outside the scope of the FTCA
or comes within an exception to the FTCA, most (but not all) courts of
appeals169 have held that a Bivens constitutional tort claim against an indi-
vidual federal officer and arising from the same event is barred.
Professor James Pfander and Neil Aggarwal argue that such inter-
pretations of the Judgment Bar have “gone terribly wrong.”170 In Bivens,
the Judgment Bar, and the Perils of Dynamic Textualism, they carefully
trace the original purpose of the Judgment Bar back to Congress’s intent “to
166. SCHUCK, supra note 113, at 101.
167. See supra Part I.E.
168. 28 U.S.C. § 2676 (2006). See Estate of Trentadue ex rel. Aguilar v. United States, 397
F.3d 840, 858–59 (10th Cir. 2005).
169. See, e.g., Unus v. Kane, 565 F.3d 103, 121–22 (4th Cir. 2009); Manning v. United States,
546 F.3d 430, 432–37 (7th Cir. 2008); Harris v. United States, 422 F.3d 322, 333–37 (6th Cir.
2005); Farmer v. Perrill, 275 F.3d 958, 963 & n.7 (10th Cir. 2001); Hoosier Bancorp of Indiana,
Inc. v. Rasmussen, 90 F.3d 180 (7th Cir. 1996); Gasho v. United States, 39 F.3d 1420, 1436–38
(9th Cir. 1994). But see Hallock v. Bonner, 387 F.3d 147, 154–55 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding judg-
ment bar does not apply to FTCA suits dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, which the court held
included dismissals based on FTCA exceptions), vacated on other grounds, 546 U.S. 345 (2006);
Kreines v. United States, 959 F.2d 834, 838 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that judgment bar statute
does not preclude a Bivens claim when the FTCA suit was filed “contemporaneously”).
170. James E. Pfander & Neil Aggarwal, Bivens, the Judgment Bar, and the Perils of Dy-
namic Textualism, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 417, 418 (2011).
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block a specific kind of duplicative litigation that could result from the gov-
ernment’s acceptance of respondeat superior liability in suits for ordinary
negligence.”171 As Pfander and Aggarwal explain, when the Judgment Bar
was enacted in 1946, under then-existing preclusion rules and the master-
servant doctrine of the period, while a judgment in favor of an employee by
finding non-negligence would operate to preclude later suit against the em-
ployer who had only derivative responsibility, the opposite was not true.172
That is, a judgment in favor of the employer would not extend to preclude
renewed litigation against the individual employee whose acts were alleged
to have been negligent.173 Congress enacted the Judgment Bar, then, to
“block negligence suits against the driver of a federal postal truck whose act
or omission had given rise to an earlier negligence suit [under the FTCA]
against the federal government.”174 To address this particular derivative lia-
bility and common liability theory scenario, Congress adopted the term
“same subject matter” from the 1942 Restatement of Judgments to “describe
a narrow subset of claims that rested on the same theory of liability” and
thus to bar subsequent suits against a government employee that had been
negated by a finding of non-negligence in a prior suit against the
government.175
Neglecting the history, purpose, and early operation of the Judgment
Bar, courts of appeals have construed the statutory text out of context and,
in Pfander and Aggarwal’s words, engaged in a “breathtakingly dynamic
statutory interpretation” to extend the Judgment Bar beyond the context of
liability under the same common-law tort theory to encompass all claims
that arose out of the same factual transaction.176 Displaying what Pfander
and Aggarwal fear is “a degree of hostility towards Bivens claimants,” these
courts mistakenly have applied the Judgment Bar to preclude constitutional
claims brought against individual government officers under Bivens, even
when the prior judgment in favor of the government merely concluded that
the claim did not fall within the scope of the FTCA.177
In any event, the Supreme Court plainly has taken the individual-of-
ficer liability side in this debate about accountability in damages for consti-
tutional infractions. Thus, whatever may be the public policy arguments for
holding the government liable directly for the constitutional infringements
of its agents, the judicially-implied Bivens action is one against the individ-
ual government employee and no other.
171. Id. at 418.
172. Id. at 424–425.
173. Id. at 429.
174. Id. at 418.
175. Id. at 421.
176. Id. at 418.
177. Id. at 423.
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Congress, of course, would be free to adopt a legislative alternative
and authorize constitutional tort suits against the federal government, while
simultaneously eliminating individual officer liability under Bivens. But,
unless and until it does, the Bivens remedy, limited though it may be in
scope to certain circumstances and qualified as it is by immunity for de-
fendants acting with objective reasonableness, remains a prominent
landmark of the jurisprudential landscape.
CONCLUSION
As long as the Republic endures, the federal courts will encounter
claims against the national government for the injuries regrettably but inevi-
tably visited on persons, entities, and property through the far-flung and
multifarious operations of the United States government. The claim for in-
dividual justice in court to an aggrieved person or entity must be balanced
against the common good advanced by effective collective measures of
government and the preservation of democratic rule. Questions will persist
about the competence of the courts as compared to other institutions of
government when politically-controversial or policy-oriented subjects arise
in such litigation. Accordingly, legislative and judicial decision-makers will
continue to struggle with the appropriate nature and scope of prudential
constraints on adjudication of common-law and constitutional torts against
the federal government to prevent undue intervention by the courts into
political choices and policy-making.
No perfect adjudication process or ideal set of substantive liability
standards is likely to be identified for resolving all claims of harm presented
against the federal government. Nonetheless, with the enactment of the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act and the articulation of Bivens constitutional tort doc-
trine, the history of the past sixty-five years confirms the possibility of
legislative and judicial progress in crafting judicial remedies for most of the
tortious harms caused by the wrongful conduct of government agencies and
officials. In this symposium, the contributors report on and question the
progress made, identify and contest the problems remaining, and chart vari-
ous paths toward further progress in this vital area of public law.
Through the contributions made to this volume of the University of St.
Thomas Law Journal, our remarkable group of symposium contributors
have produced a substantial resource that should be of practical value to
those litigating common-law and constitutional tort claims against the fed-
eral government, those defending the government against such claims, and
decision-makers in the legislative and judicial branches. The complex and
often knotty legal issues raised by common-law and constitutional tort
claims against the federal government are of practical concern to real peo-
ple suffering concrete injuries through the actions of the government and of
government officials, while also implicating fundamental questions of legal
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theory about the proper role of the judiciary, just governance, governmental
accountability, and democratic rule. These issues rarely are addressed in the
legal literature in such a comprehensive and integrated manner as reflected
in the series of articles in this symposium volume.
At this conference on “Official Wrongdoing and the Civil Liability of
the Federal Government and Officers,” we succeeded in bringing together
prominent legal scholars and leading practicing lawyers from both sides of
the plaintiff-defendant divide in government litigation. On a brisk March
day in Minneapolis, experienced advocates in lawsuits against the federal
government came face-to-face—outside of the courtroom—with senior
counsel for the government who have defended against such claims. They
were joined by prominent scholars in the field (most of whom had previ-
ously toiled in the trenches and often continue to be involved in civil litiga-
tion with the federal government). Together with the student editors and
members of the University of St. Thomas Law Journal, I am deeply thankful
for the generosity of our symposium participants in joining with us at this
timely conference and for contributing the well-informed, carefully-consid-
ered, and thought-provoking articles that follow.
